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I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 13' of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 has been in effect
now for four years.3 During this time two issues regarding the treatment of
home mortgages under chapter 13 have generated increasing litigation.4 First,
bankruptcy courts have wrestled with the question whether the Bankruptcy
Code,5 created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act, permits cure of default on a
debtor's home 6 mortgage when the debtor files a plan for adjustment of debts
under chapter 13 after the mortgage debt has been accelerated pursuant to an
acceleration clause in the mortgage instrument.7 Once a mortgage has been
accelerated by the mortgagee, the mortgagor is in default on the entire prin-
cipal amount of the mortgage. So far, courts have divided on the correct
resolution to the permissible cure problem. The second issue that has gen-
erated litigation under chapter 13 is twofold: (1) Whether the automatic stay
provisions of chapter 3's section 362(d)(2) 8 apply in whole, in part, or not at
all to chapter 13; and (2) if they are applicable, how the debtor may prove that
the home is necessary to an effective reorganization under section
362(d)(2)(B). A petition filed under chapter 13 operates as an automatic stay of
most actions against property of the debtor's estate. 9 A mortgagee who
wishes to foreclose on the mortgaged property of the debtor may seek relief
from the automatic stay under section 362(d)(2). Under that section the bank-
ruptcy court must grant relief from the automatic stay if the debtor has satis-
fied a two-pronged test: (1) the debtor must have no equity in the property,
and (2) the property must not be necessary to an effective reorganization.' 0
Some courts have held that no part of section 362(d)(2) applies to chapter 13, "
even though section 362(d)(2) is contained in chapter 3 and section 103(a)(13)
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. III 1979).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978) (codified as II U.S.C., in various sections of 28 U.S.C., and in
several other titles).
3. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act took effect on October 1, 1979.
4. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Coleman, 5 Bankr. 812 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1980).
5. The Bankruptcy Code, which is Title 11 of the United States Code, was created by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978).
6. The term "home" refers to the debtor's principal residence.
7. Chapter 13 is entitled "Adjustment Of Debts Of An Individual With Regular Income." The term
"preacceleration default" will be used in this Comment to refer to the amount of default that existed prior to
acceleration, rather than the amount of default existing after acceleration has occurred.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
9. Id. § 362.
10. Id. § 362(d)(2).
11. See, e.g., In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Feimster, 3 Bankr. II (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1979).
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clearly makes chapter 3 applicable to chapter 13 cases. 2 A few courts have
found that, because the word "reorganization" is used in chapter I 1 (business
reorganizations) but not in chapter 13, only the equity prong of section
362(d)(2) applies to chapter 13 cases.' 3
Even if section 362(d)(2) applies in its entirety to chapter 13 cases, the
standard of proof that will govern the second prong of the test-the effective
reorganization requirement-is unclear. Section 362(g) expressly places the
burden of proving lack of equity (the first prong of section 362(d)(2)) on the
party seeking relief 4-in most cases, the creditor. If the mortgagee can prove
lack of equity, the burden of proof on all other issues shifts to the party
opposing relief.'5 Therefore, if the court finds the second prong of section
362(d)(2) applicable to a chapter 13 case, the debtor has the burden of showing
that his principal residence is necessary to an effective reorganization. If the
debtor cannot meet this burden of proof, a mortgagee may have the stay lifted
as a matter of right provided that he has proved that the debtor has no equity
in the mortgaged property. The automatic stay will not be lifted under section
362(d)(2) if the debtor does prove necessity.
The resolution of these two technical problems-the permissible cure
issue and the applicability of the reorganization prong of section 362(d)(2) to
chapter 13-may have a profound effect on whether one of the primary goals
of the bankruptcy reform effort is attained: encouraging debtor rehabilitation
under chapter 13 as an alternative to liquidation of the debtor's entire estate
under chapter 7.16 This Comment first will address the permissible cure issue
because it affects every chapter 13 debtor whose mortgage was accelerated
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. It then will discuss the applica-
bility of the automatic stay provisions of section 362(d)(2) to chapter 13.
II. CURE OF PREACCELERATION DEFAULT ON THE
DEBTOR'S HOME MORTGAGE
A. The Controversy
Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 17 provides that a chapter 13
plan 8 may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
12. Section 103(a) states: "Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and5 of this title
apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of this title." II U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. III 1979).
13. See, e.g., In re Branch, 10 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Youngs, 7 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1980) (the court stated that § 362(d)(2)(B) is not applicable to chapter 13, but refused to decide whether
§ 362(d)(2) is inapplicable in whole or in part); In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (Supp. I1 1979).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. DOC. NO. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. 2 (15th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]; H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1979).
18. Under chapter 13 the debtor is required to file a plan for repayment of his outstanding debts. I I U.S.C.
§ 1321 (Supp. III 1979). The provisions of § 1322 determine what the plan must propose in addition to what the
plan may propose. Id. § 1322.
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secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims."' 9 Under section
1322(b)(3) a plan may "provide for the curing or waiving of any default." 20
Section 1322(b)(5) states that a chapter 13 plan may,
[n]otwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of any
default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any unsecured claim or any secured claim on which the last payment is
due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.
To illustrate the interplay of these provisions, suppose that a debtor files
under chapter 13 after the mortgagee of his principal residence has exercised a
contractual right of acceleration. Because the entire balance of the mortgage
is immediately due, the "last payment" no longer is due "after the date on
which the final payment under the plan is due." Had the mortgagee not
accelerated the mortgage, the debtor, pursuant to section 1322(b)(5), would
have been able to cure the prepetition default under the repayment plan filed
with the court. It is unclear from a plain reading of section 1322(b)(5), how-
ever, whether the debtor may cure the default after acceleration. The am-
biguity of section 1322(b) has left the courts to decide whether Congress
intended an acceleration to have no effect on the debtor's use of section
1322(b) procedures, in which case the debtor clearly could cure a default on a
home mortgage, or whether Congress intended the debtor to be unable to cure
a default on a home mortgage once acceleration had occurred. The diversity
of opinions regarding the correct answer to this question 22 attests to the
ambiguity of section 1322(b)(5) and its scant legislative history.
B. Legislative History
The legislative processes that culminated in the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 19 7 8 23 began in 1970 when Congress created the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 24 The Commission
issued a report in 197325 that described the reasons for the sporadic use of
Chapter XIII,2 6 the predecessor of chapter 13. Under section 606(1) of the old
Chapter XIII a Chapter XIII plan could not include "claims secured by estates
19. Id. § 1322(b)(2).
20. Id. § 1322(b)(3).
21. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
22. For an example of two courts holding opposite views on the applicability of § 1322(b)(5) to chapter 13
proceedings, compare In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (§ 1322(b)(5) does not preclude cure
of an accelerated home mortgage), with In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (no cure of
accelerated home mortgage debt).
23. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978) (codified as II U.S.C., in various sections of 28 U.S.C., and in
several other titles).
24. The Commission was established by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. The law
was a result of S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and H.R. Res. 970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
25. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16.
26. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended (repealed 1979).
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in real property or chattels real."- 27 The Commission concluded that this
provision limited the usefulness of Chapter XIII:
The first difficulty arises out of the fact that a Chapter XIII plan cannot deal with
any claim secured by real property. The result is that, although a petitioner is
frequently obligated to make installment payments for the purchase of his home,
the plan itself cannot deal with that indebtedness. Nonetheless, courts have fre-
quently enjoined foreclosure of real estate mortgages and contracts during the
pendency of a Chapter XIII case and have in other ways recognized the need of a
Chapter XIII petitioner for protection of his right to keep his equity in his home
during his performance of the terms of a Chapter XIII plan.
2 8
In addressing this problem the Commission recommended that the debtor
be able "to include in his plan a proposal for paying debts secured by liens on
his residence and curing defaults thereon within a reasonable time."2 9 The
phrase "on which payment is due after the last payment under the plan," 30
which has been interpreted by some courts to prevent debtors from curing
preacceleration default, 3' did not appear in this Commission recommenda-
tion. Instead, the Commission indicated the need for a provision that would
permit cure of default even though the mortgagee had begun foreclosure
proceedings.32
The Commission's explanation accompanying its formal recommenda-
tion contains language very similar to that found in section 1322(b)(5) as
enacted:
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that the new Act authorize inclusion in
any plan proposed under ... the successor to Chapter XIII of the present Act
provisions for the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and the maintenance
of payments while the case is pending on claims secured by a lien on the debtor's
residence and on claims secured by personal property on which the last payment is
due after completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan. 33
Thus, the Commission recommended that a Chapter XIII plan authorize cure
of the debtor's home mortgage and long-term debts. The Commission recom-
mendation did not preclude cure of preacceleration default.
The Commission Report contained a proposed statute, 34 the "Commis-
sion Bill," that was introduced in the House 35 along with a competing bill
proposed by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. 6 Congress
failed to formally act on the measures during the 93d Congress; thus, the
Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill were reintroduced in the 94th Congress
27. Id. § 606(1).
28. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 13.
29. Id.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1979).
31. See infra notes 58-94 and accompanying text.
32. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 166.
33. Id.
34. See id. Part II.
35. H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
36. H.R. 16,643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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as House Resolutions 3137 and 3238 respectively. Section 6-201(4) of the
Commission Bill provided that a wage-earner rehabilitation plan
may include provisions for the curing of defaults within a reasonable time and the
maintenance of payments while the case is pending on claims secured by a lien on
the debtor's residence and on unsecured claims or claims secured by personal
property on which the last payment is due after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan.39
The note accompanying section 6-201 explained:
Clause (4) is new and confers a limited authority to deal with claims secured by a
lien on the debtor's residence and long-term claims which cannot be fully paid
under the plan. This clause does not authorize reduction of the size or varying of
the time of installment payments nor, except in instances where the last payment
on a claim secured by a lien on the debtor's residence is due during the term of the
plan, is it contemplated that the claim would be fully paid off under the plan. Any
unpaid balance would not be covered by a discharge granted pursuant to 6-207.
But while the debtor is operating under the plan, he may be able to employ the
authorization given under this clause to preserve his home and to keep current on
a long-term debt by provisions in the plan for curing defaults and maintaining
payments. 40
Although section 6-201(4) did not authorize reducing the size or varying the
time of installment payments, it did authorize cure. 4' The section contained
no suggestion that preacceleration cure was precluded.
During the hearings on H.R. 31 the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights heard testimony on the importance of permitting a Chap-
ter XIII plan to deal with home mortgages.42 Judge Cyr of Maine, testifying on
behalf of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, stated:
I think we have to permit a Chapter XIII plan to deal, in part at least, with real
estate secured claims, that is at least those that involve the debtor's residence.
Often the debtor has fallen behind on the mortgage payments on his home. That is
one of the things that we find most often occurs. Real estate mortgagees are not
the quickest ones to drop the hammer on the debtor, and debtors who are forced
into this kind of circumstance will take the easy way out as long as they can. But, if
they can't get the kind of relief they need in Chapter XIII, they won't be in
Chapter XIII. Retaining a man's home, I submit, is a very important form of relief,
which he believes he must have, but can't get now under Chapter XIII.43
Perhaps a similar argument influenced the House when it passed H.R.
8200. 44 Section 1322 of H.R. 820045 permitted a Chapter XIII debtor even
37. H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974).
38. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
39. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, Part II, § 6-201(4).
40. Id. note 5 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1330-31 (1976).
43. Id. (testimony of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, Bankruptcy Judge, Maine).
44. 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 457-78 (1978).
45. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1322, 123 CONG. REC. 11,760 (1977).
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more flexibility with home mortgagees than did H.R. 31. Section 1322(b)(2)
permitted the modification of the rights of holders of any secured claims. 46
Section 1322(b)(3) permitted the curing or waiving of any default. 47 Section
1322(b)(5) provided for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and
the maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured or
secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on which the
final payment under the plan is due. 48 Thus, the home mortgagee's claim
could be modified within section 1322(b)(2) and cured within section
1322(b)(3) or 1322(b)(5).
At the same time that the House was preparing its version of section
1322(b), the Senate heard testimony that permitting debtors to modify claims
secured by the debtor's principal residence would cause instability in the
long-term home financing industry.49 Perhaps in fear that enactment of the
House version of section 1322(b)(2) would make securing mortgages more
difficult for consumers, the Senate precluded the modification of claims
wholly secured by a security interest in the debtor's principal residence in its
version of section 1322(b). 50 Section 1322(b)(5) retained the provision for cure
of default on long-term debt, but did not expressly apply it to a home mort-
gage debt. 5
Section 1322(b)(2) of the House amendment 52 represented a compromise
between opposing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The House
agreed to preclude modification of home mortgages under 1322(b)(2).53 At the
same time section 1322(b)(5) was amended to show that a claim secured by the
debtor's principal residence may be treated under section 1322(b)(5) of the
House amendment. 4 Apparently, the House preferred to permit modification
and cure, the Senate preferred to preclude both modification and cure, and
the final provision was intended to preclude modification but permit cure.
If Congress intended to enact a compromise that reflected the House
version of the cure provisions, it also intended to permit cure of preaccelera-
tion default. H.R. 8200 section 1322(b) would have permitted this cure within
either section 1322(b)(3) or section 1322(b)(5).55 The legislative history, how-
ever, offers no resolution of the permissible cure debate. The most that can be
said with assurance is that the legislative history of section 1322(b) nowhere
46. Id. § 1322(b)(2).
47. Id. § 1322(b)(3).
48. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
49. See Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 337 (1975) (statement of Richard Hesse, Con-
sultant, National Consumer Law Center); id. at 141 (statement of Walter W. Vaughan, Chairman, American
Bankers Association and Consumer Bankers Association Task Force on Bankruptcy).
50. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1977).
51. Id.
52. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1322(b)(2), 124 CONG. REC. 11,106 (1978).
53. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979), with H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(b)(2), 123
CONG. REC. 11,760 (1977).
54. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. III 1979), with S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(b)(5) (1977).
55. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(b), 123 CONG. REC. 11,760 (1977).
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explicitly suggests that Congress intended to permit cure only if the mort-
gagee had not yet accelerated the home mortgage debt.
C. The Cases
Hampered by the ambiguous language of section 1322(b) and its scanty
legislative history, bankruptcy courts have been unable to reach a consensus
concerning what effect the cure provisions of sections 1322(b)(3) and
1322(b)(5) will have on chapter 13 cases.
Courts holding that cure of preacceleration default pursuant to section
1322(b)(5) is not permitted under chapter 13 have declared debts immediately
due and payable upon acceleration by the mortgagee. 56 Bankruptcy courts
troubled by the policy implications of this holding have, in allowing cure, (1)
attempted to find statutory grounds for their decisions; (2) based their anal-
yses solely on policy considerations; or (3) relied on the "other security"
approach.57 The following discussion examines these four approaches that
bankruptcy courts have employed to interpret section 1322(b)(5).
1. No Cure of Preacceleration Default
In re LaPaglia5s illustrates the view that section 1322(b)(5) precludes
cure of preacceleration default of a debtor's home mortgage. LaPaglia con-
cerned a mortgage bond that had been accelerated before the debtor filed
under chapter 13.59 The mortgagee objected to the debtor's proposed plan
because it failed to provide for the debtor's tender of the amount due on the
mortgagei ° The mortgagee argued that preacceleration default could not be
cured under section 1322(b)(5) and that a plan could not "alter its right to
collect the full mortgage debt over the life of the plan." 61 The debtor re-
sponded that section 1322(b)(5) allows the cure of the mortgage default within
a reasonable time and the maintenance of current mortgage payments. The
debtor expressed concern that all mortgagees would interpret a ruling in the
mortgagee's favor as a license to accelerate mortgages upon insignificant
defaults, thus defeating the cure provisions of section 1322(b)(5). 62
The LaPaglia court focused on the language of section 1322(b)(5) limiting
the availability of cure under that section to debts "on which the last payment
56. See, e.g., In re Williams, 11 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981). See infra subpart II(C)(1). See also In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Canady, 9 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
57. See, e.g., In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (statutory grounds), see infra subpart
II(C)(2)(a); In re Sapp, 11 Bankr. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (statutory grounds); In re Acevedo, 9 Bankr. 852
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (statutory grounds); In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (policy
considerations), see infra subpart II(C)(2)(b); In re Pittman, 7 Bankr. 760 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (policy
considerations); United Co. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 Bankr. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980) ("other security"
approach), see infra subpart II(C)(2)(c).
58. 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
59. Id. at 938.
60. Id. at 939.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 939-40.
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is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due." 63 It
looked first to state law to determine when the debtor's last payment on the
mortgage was due.64 Finding that under New York State law acceleration
changes the debt from one payable in installments at some time in the future
to one payable immediately in full, the court sustained the mortgagee's objec-
tion to confirmation of the plan. 65
The court dismissed the argument that a holding in favor of the mortgagee
would prompt all mortgagees to accelerate mortgage debts upon insignificant
defaults and thereby defeat the cure provisions of section 1322(b)(5).6 Judge
Price stated in his opinion that "[i]t has been my experience, based upon the
Chapter 13 cases pending before me, that banks and other lenders are loath to
foreclose mortgages, considering the time and expense involved and their
chances of recovering the full amount due them at a forced sale." 67 Judge
Price found that the facts of the instant case supported his view. The mort-
gagee in LaPaglia took no action for eight months even though the debtor
made no attempt to make any payments during that period. Even after the
mortgagee exercised its right to accelerate the debt, it waited almost three
months before initiating foreclosure proceedings. 68
Judge Price's observation does not effectively rebut the argument that
the court's holding in LaPaglia might encourage future mortgagees to ac-
celerate more promptly than they would have done had the court permitted
cure of preacceleration default. Furthermore, while it is possible that, regard-
less of whether debtors are permitted to cure preacceleration default, "real
estate mortgagees [will not be] the quickest ones to drop the hammer on the
debtor," 69 the LaPaglia decision does effectively preclude many debtors in
the Eastern District of New York from using chapter 13 once acceleration has
occurred. 70 The LaPaglia court did not expressly address this possible con-
sequence of its decision.
The LaPaglia court indicated that a debtor would be permitted to cure
preacceleration default if state law permitted payment of arrearages after the
acceleration of the mortgage's due date.7' Judge Price noted that some
63. Id. at 941.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 943.
66. Id. at 945.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 1331 (1976) (testimony of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, Bank-
ruptcy Judge, Maine).
70. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), in which the court stated:
It is extremely doubtful that many mortagors faced with the three-year or five-year limit on plan
duration... could conceivably muster enough income to satisfy a fully accelerated mortgage debt
over the course of their plans. If such were required, many homeowners would in effect be categorical-
ly denied access to Chapter 13. This would exact a harsh result and obviously contrary [sic] to the
rehabilitative thrust of Chapter 13.
Id. at 304.
71. 8 Bankr. 937, 945 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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states-California, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Utah, for example-have statutes that
specifically allow a debtor to stop a threatened sale and reinstate a debt if,
prior to the sale at foreclosure, the debtor tenders only the arrearages, not-
withstanding any acceleration provision in the mortgage or bond. 72 The court
noted in dicta that, in these states, section 1322(b)(5) would permit the cure
of a default by the payment, under a plan, of only the arrearages-irrespec-
tive of any acceleration. 73
The holding in LaPaglia is consistent with the language of section
1322(b)(5). 74 The result, however, violates the congressional policy of en-
couraging debtor rehabilitation through chapter 13.75
The debtor in LaPaglia did not argue that cure of preacceleration default
was permitted under section 1322(b)(3), which provides that a chapter 13 plan
may "cure or waive any default." 7 6 The debtor in In re Williams, 77 however,
sought to use sections 1322(b)(3) and 1322(b)(5) serially, "first to cure prepeti-
tion defaults and second, to maintain current payments while arrearages are
being cured .... The court did not find this argument persuasive. In
Williams the debtor proposed to cure prepetition default under section
1322(b)(3) and to maintain current payments during the plan under section
1322(b)(5). 79 The court found that "[a]lthough § 1322(b)(3) states that any
default may be cured or waived, it appears to the court that (b)(3) was not
intended to apply where (b)(5) ... is applicable." 80 The court held that
claims secured solely by a security interest in real property can be cured only
under section 1322(b)(5). 81
In a line of cases from the bankruptcy court of the Southern District of
Ohio, Judge Sidman permitted cure by applying section 1322(b)(3) and section
1322(b)(5) serially, reasoning that deceleration is a primary objective of the
provisions of section 1322(b)(5).8 2 This reasoning, however, was rejected on
appeal in In re Soderlund.83 The mortgagee in Soderlund had exercised its
right of acceleration before the debtor filed under chapter 13.84 In the lower
court the mortgagee argued that the final payment of its note was not due after
the date upon which final payment under the plan was due and that, therefore,
section 1322(b)(5) did not apply.85 Judge Sidman found that the mortgagee had
72. See statutes cited id. at 945.
73. 8 Bankr. 937, 945 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
74. See supra text accompanying note 21.
75. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
76. If U.S.C. § 1332(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
77. 11 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981).
78. Id. at 505.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 506.
81. Id.
82. See In re Rogers, No. 80-04701 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 1981); In re Soderlund, 7 Bankr. 44 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 18 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Sapp, 11 Bankr. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
83. 18 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
84. In re Soderlund, 7 Bankr. 44, 44-45 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
85. Id. at 45.
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failed to consider the impact of section 1322(b)(3), a section that is "not
qualified in any respect and does not appear to be exclusive in its applicability
to a situation involving a defaulted first mortgage on residential real estate." '8
The court concluded that section 1322(b)(3) and section 1322(b)(5) may be
used serially, first to cure a prepetition default and then to maintain current
payments during the life of the plan while arrearages are cured within a
reasonable time.87 The court stated:
Since both the provisions of § 1322(b)(3) and § 1322(b)(5) indicate that a plan may
provide for the curing of any default, it is immaterial that a prepetition acceleration
clause may have been invoked by the creditor. The debtor has the choice, under
the clear authority of § 1322(b)(3) of the Code, of providing in his plan for the
curing of such prepetition default and reinstating the terms of the mortgage.&s
On appeal Judge Kinneary held that section 1322(b)(3) does not apply to
the holder of a secured claim secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence. 89 The court found the argu-
ments of the creditor persuasive. The creditor had argued that (1) section
1322(b)(3) conflicts with section 1322(b)(2); (2) section 1322(b)(3) does not
contain language indicating that it was meant to be an exception to section
1322(b)(2), but section 1322(b)(5) does contain such language; and (3) section
1322(b)(5) would be unnecessary if section 1322(b)(3) were interpreted as being
applicable to residential first mortgages. 90
The court held that as a matter of statutory construction the serial ap-
plication approach is flawed because section 1322(b)(3) is broader than sec-
tion 1322(b)(5) and would render section 1322(b)(5) redundant if it were held to
apply to cure of residential home mortgage default. 9' In addition, only section
1322(b)(5) contains the language "notwithstanding section 1322(b)(2)," in-
dicating that Congress intended section 1322(b)(5) to be the exclusive excep-
tion to section 1322(b)(2). 92 Nonetheless, the result of the serial application
approach is consistent with the broad policy objective of encouraging debtor
rehabilitation instead of liquidation.
If cure of preacceleration default on a home mortgage is not permitted
under sections 1322(b)(3) or 1322(b)(5) and the plan may not modify the claim
because of section 1322(b)(2), then the chapter 13 debtor should be required to
pay the entire principal amount of the mortgage immediately. Courts holding
that the debtor can plan to provide for payment of the accelerated debt over
the life of the plan, despite their finding that preacceleration default cannot be
cured under sections 1322(b)(2) or 1322(b)(5), have not explained the source
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. In re Soderlund, 18 Bankr. 12, 16 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
90. Id. at 15.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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of the debtor's authorization to modify the home mortgage debt. 93 If the
payment is immediately due and payable and may not be modified under one
of the relevant provisions of section 1322, no reason exists for permitting the
debtor to pay the accelerated debt over the life of the plan. It probably makes
little practical difference whether the debtor is permitted to pay the mortgage
balance over the life of the plan or whether he is required to immediately pay
the entire balance in full. In either case most debtors in need of relief will be
effectively precluded from seeking rehabilitation if the mortgage debt on their
principal residence was accelerated prior to the chapter 13 filing.
Other cases holding that a chapter 13 plan may not provide for cure of
preacceleration default on the debtor's home mortgage have echoed the
reasoning of LaPaglia, Williams, and Soderlund by basing their findings
strictly on statutory construction. 94 No court has offered any policy reasons
for interpreting section 1322(b)(5) to preclude cure of preacceleration default
of a debtor's home mortgage.
2. Permitting Cure of Preacceleration Default
Prompted by policy concerns, a few courts have avoided the literal ap-
plication of section 1322(b)(5) by finding independent grounds for concluding
that section 1322(b) permits cure of preacceleration default. One bankruptcy
court has interpreted the clause "on which the last payment is due" to mean
"on which the last pre-acceleration payment is due." 95 Some bankruptcy
judges have based their decisions solely on policy considerations. 96 Finally, a
few cases have held that modification of the mortgagee's claim was not pro-
hibited by section 1322(b)(2) because the mortgage was not secured only by a
security interest in the debtor's principal residence.
97
a. Permitting Cure Based on Statutory Interpretation
The court in In re Breuer98 permitted cure of preacceleration default by
interpreting the clause in section 1322(b)(5), "on which the last payment is
93. See In re Lynch, 12 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981) (the court confirmed a plan proposing
payment pursuant to section 1322(b)(5) of the entire amount owed under the creditors' foreclosure judgments
within the plan's three-year term); In re Whitten, 11 Bankr. 333 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1981) (the accelerated
mortgage debt could not be modified under § 1322(b)(2), but the default could be cured under § 1322(b)(5) by
providing for the payment of the entire principal amount of the mortgage within a reasonable time); In re
Canady, 9 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (debtor could cure neither under § 1322(b)(2) nor under
§ 1322(b)(5) because the last payment on the mortgage was not due after the date on which final payment under
the plan was due; the court indicated in dicta, however, that the debtor could plan to pay the entire principal
amount of the mortgage under the plan); In re Coleman, 5 Bankr. 812 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (the court apparently
would have permitted cure of a vendor's lien within a reasonable time under § 1322(b)(5) by payment of the
entire amount of the lien, which had been reduced to a judgment prior to the bankruptcy filing).
94. See, e.g., In re Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Whitten, 11 Bankr. 333 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
95. In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
96. See, e.g., In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
97. See, e.g., In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re DuPree, 6 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1980).
98. 4 Bankr. 499, 501 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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due," to mean "on which the last payment before acceleration is dud." In
Breuer the court found that the last payment under the mortgage before fore-
closure was not due until 1993, "much later than the date on which the final
payment under the plan is due." 99 Judge Schwartzberg bolstered this inter-
pretation of section 1322(b)(5) with several persuasive policy arguments. He
found that "it would be contrary to the spirit of Chapter 13, to permit the
debtor to lose his residence when the payment of $2,944.78 would cure the
default on his first mortgage. "'00 The Breuer court also contrasted chapter I 1
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act with chapter 13:
Unlike Chapter 11, which by definition is a "Reorganization" chapter designed to
assisting [sic] distressed businesses, Chapter 13 is directed to consumer relief so as
to enable an individual debtor with regular income to develop and perform, under
court supervision and protection, a plan for the repayment of his debts over an
extended period of time, rather than opting for liquidation under Chapter 7. 101
The court concluded that "the debtor's retention of his residence is palpably
envisioned under Chapter 13" 102 if the plan otherwise complies with the pro-
visions of chapter 13.
The Breuer court's interpretation of section 1322(b)(5) appears to reflect
what Congress intended to accomplish by enacting its compromise version of
section 1322(b)(5).' 03 The only difficulty with this interpretation is its lack of
support in the express language of section 1322(b)(5). That section states in
pertinent part that the date of "last payment under the plan-not the date of
"last payment before acceleration" '04-determines when cure is permitted.
The plain meaning rule should not govern interpretation, however, when the
statute is ambiguous. 105 When a statute is ambiguous a court should attempt to
discern congressional intent rather than focus on the precise language of the
statute. 106 Since a plain reading of section 1322(b) does not indicate whether
cure of default of a debtor's home mortgage is allowed under chapter 13 after
acceleration, the plain meaning rule has little relevance to the proper inter-
pretation of section 1322(b)(5).
b. Permitting Cure Based on Policy Considerations
Judge Parente's analysis in In re Taddeo 107 represents one court's effort
to resolve the section 1322(b) ambiguity by referring to policy considerations.
In Taddeo Judge Parente concluded, after examining both case law and the
99. Id. at 501.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 501-02.
102. Id. at 502.
103. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
104. I1 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (Supp. I 1979).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269 (1929); Caminette v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917).
106. For an excellent discussion of the role of the courts in helping chapter 13 achieve the declared goal of
Congress, see Hughes, Chapter 13's Potential for Abuse, 58 N.C.L. REV. 831, 849-51 (1980).
107. 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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deceleration provisions of chapter 11, that "neither contractual acceleration
clauses nor foreclosure judgments thereon preclude a bankruptcy court from
reinstating a pre-acceleration payment schedule where federal bankruptcy
law so permits."'08
The Taddeo court based its conclusion that federal bankruptcy law does
permit cure of preacceleration default of home mortgages under chapter 13 on
four considerations. First, the court found that
in view of the debtor rehabilitation theme so pervasively laced throughout Chapter
13 . . .it is difficult to perceive how as a matter of policy or logic one can justify
turning back the clock on acceleration for business debtors in Chapter 11, but
refuse to do the same for consumer debtors in Chapter 13.109
Second, the court observed that the mortgagee's claim is protected even
if cure of preacceleration default is permitted." Claims on which the last
payment is due after the expiration of the debtor's plan are nondischargeable
under section 1328(a)(1);.. therefore the mortgagor must pay the mortgage
debt in full." 2 In addition, the mortgagee's claim is not subject to "cram
down" under section 1322(b)(2)." 3
Third, the Taddeo court found that if mortgagors were required to
"muster enough income to satisfy a fully accelerated mortgage debt over the
course of their plans," " 4 many homeowners would be effectively denied
access to chapter 13. This result, the court held, is contrary to the "rehabilita-
tive thrust of Chapter 13." "5
Fourth, the court concluded that nothing in the legislative history of the
Code or in the language of section 1322(b)(5) indicates that the drafters in-
tended to preclude deceleration of the chapter 13 debtor's home mortgage
debt. I6 All of these considerations supported the court's holding that chapter
13 debtors may attempt cure of preacceleration default and reinstate the orig-
inal mortgage payment schedule at any time prior to the sale of the foreclosed
property. "
7
The Taddeo decision is thorough and well reasoned. By allowing cure of
preacceleration default, it satisfies Congress' intention (gleaned from the leg-
islative history of section 1322(b)(5)) to encourage repayment under a rehabil-
itation plan rather than force liquidation of the debtor's estate."'
108. Id. at 303.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 304.
I11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. A cram down is the confirmation by a court of a classification plan over the dissent of a class of
claims or ownership interests. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 134 (1979). For specific requirements, see I1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)
(Supp. III 1979).
114. 9 Bankr. 299, 304 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 305.
117. Id. at 306.
118. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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c. Permitting Cure Based on the "Other Security" Approach
The third approach used to support a finding that cure of preacceleration
default of a debtor's home mortgage is permitted under section 1322(b) can be
called the "other security" 9 approach. Section 1322(b)(2) precludes mod-
ification only of a claim "secured only by a security interest in the debtor's
principal residence."' 20 One court has interpreted the section 1322(b)(2) pro-
viso to permit cure of preacceleration default when the mortgagee's claim has
been reduced to a judgment. 2 ' To understand this interpretation, it is helpful
to consider two cases that apply section 1322(b)(2) in a conventional manner:
In re DuPree2 and United Companies Financial Corp. v. Brantley.'23
In In re DuPree a debt was secured by an automobile and a real estate
mortgage. 124 The court noted that the legislative history accompanying sec-
tion 1322(b)(2) shed no light on whether Congress intended to permit a chapter
13 plan to modify such a claim.'5 H~wever, "with knowledge of the overall
intent of Chapter 13 to afford debtor relief," 126 the court held that the prohibi-
tion in section 1322(b)(2) was inapplicable to the mortgagee's claim because it
was secured by both an automobile and a real estate mortgage. 27 The DuPree
court did not discuss the rationale for prohibiting modification of claims
secured only by a security interest in the debtor's principal residence.
In United Companies Financial Corp. v. Brantley 28 the court considered
the policy objectives that engendered the section 1322(b)(2) proviso.'2 In
Brantley the creditor's claim was secured by a mortgage on the debtor's
principal residence. The debtor also had assigned a life insurance policy to the
creditor. 30 In determining whether the mortgagee's claim could be modified
pursuant to section 1322(b)(2), the court discussed the policy objectives of the
section 1322(b)(2) proviso:
Although the legislative history is silent, the plain intent of the exception (in
section 1322(b)(2)) is to provide stability in the residential long-term home financ-
ing industry and market. It is to specifically protect institutional lenders engaged
only in providing long-term home mortgage financing and not lenders primarily
engaged in consumer or other areas of financing but who take security interests in
a residence or homestead to secure non-home financing debts. '
3
The Brantley court found that the creditor in that case was not engaged in
119. See infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
121. See In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
122. 6 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
123. 6 Bankr. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
124. 6 Bankr. 476, 477 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 6 Bankr. 178 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
129. Id. at 189.
130. Id. at 181.
131. Id. at 189.
[Vol. 43:905
HOME MORTGAGES UNDER CHAPTER 13
long-term residential financing 132 and that the assignment of the life insurance
policy "was taken for the stated purpose of providing additional security." 13
The court concluded that "under these circumstances, the exception to
§ 1322(b)(2) is manifestly inapplicable." 34 Accordingly, the Brantley court
refused to prohibit modification of the terms of the mortgage. 3 5
The Brantley court's interpretation of the policy underlying the section
1322(b)(2) proviso is sensible. The secured creditor's claim is well protected
by section 1325. 136 It appears that Congress intended to provide extra protec-
tion to certain residential mortgagees, but not to extend this limitation on
modification to every creditor who might take a security interest in the
debtor's principal residence. If this interpretation of the section 1322(b)(2)
proviso is correct, then a key consideration in determining whether a claim is
"secured only by a security interest" in the debtor's home for purposes of
section 1322(b)(2) should be whether the mortgagee is engaged only, or pri-
marily, in the business of providing long-term home mortgage financing. If a
creditor's claim is secured by a purchase money mortgage, it should receive
the extra protection afforded by the section 1322(b)(2) proviso. If the claim
arose, for example, from the sale of farm machinery, it should not receive any
extra protection.
Some creditors have sought to take advantage of the section 1322(b)(2)
proviso by canceling their security interests in the debtor's personal prop-
erty. '37 A creditor contemplating such an action should be aware that at least
two courts have found that creditors who cancel their security interest in the
debtor's personal property do not act in good faith. 138 These courts confirmed
the debtor's plans despite the creditor's' objection. 39
The "other security" approach to permitting cure of preacceleration
home mortgage default has been employed in a context quite unlike that of
Brantley and DuPree. For example, in In re Garner'4 the court interpreted
section 1322(b)(2) to permit modification of a mortgagee's claim, regardless of
whether the mortgagee was an institutional lender engaged in providing long-
term home mortgage financing, if the mortgagee's claim was reduced to a
judgment before the debtor filed in chapter 13. '4'
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 190.
135. Id.
136. See II U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. III 1979). This section provides that when a plan has been confirmed the
court may order that part or all of the debtor's income be paid to the trustee. For a plan to be approved it must,
among other requirements, give to the holder of the secured claim an amount equal to the allowed amount of the
claim. The holder of the claim must approve the plan.
137. See In re Green, 7 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Baksa, 5 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1980).
138. In re Green, 7 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Baksa, 5 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
139. In re Green, 7 Bankr. 8, 8-9 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Baksa, 5 Bankr. 184, 187 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1980).
140. 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
141. Id. at 801.
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In the Garner case the creditor, Dale Funding Corporation, had taken a
purchase money mortgage in the debtors' principal residence. When the
debtors defaulted on their mortgage payments, Dale Funding commenced a
foreclosure action that resulted in a judgment of foreclosure. After Dale
Funding obtained the judgment of foreclosure, but before the property was
sold, the debtors' filed their chapter 13 petition. 42 When the debtors proposed
to cure the preacceleration default on their home mortgage, Dale Funding
argued that the claim could be neither cured under section 1322(b)(5), because
the debtors' rights under the mortgage were terminated pursuant to state law,
nor modified under section 1322(b)(2), because the claim was secured only by a
security interest in the debtors' principal residence.' 43
The Garner court held that Dale Funding's claim was not secured only by
a security interest in the debtors' home. 144 The court stated that "[w]hen Dale
Funding obtained its rights under the foreclosure judgment it could no longer
assert that its rights in the real estate were 'secured only by a security inter-
est' under an existing consensual mortgage and therefore not subject to mod-
ification under Code § 1322(b)(2)."' 45
The court's conclusion that the section 1322(b)(2) limitation on modifica-
tion does not apply if the mortgagee has obtained a judgment prior to the
chapter 13 filing is novel. Although the Garner court's interpretation of sec-
tion 1322(b)(2) appears to favor the mortgagor, the court's holding in effect
takes a middle road between those cases holding that a mortgage default can
be cured even after judgment 46 and those cases holding that the mortgagee's
claim cannot be modified because of section 1322(b)(2) and cannot be cured
under section 1322(b)(5).47 Other courts that have considered whether a
home mortgage default can be cured once the mortgage has been reduced to a
judgment implicitly have held that a mortgagee who otherwise has a claim
secured only by a security interest in the debtor's principal residence con-
tinues to hold that claim even after the mortgagee has obtained a judgment in
its favor. 48 These courts have disagreed on whether preacceleration mortgage
default can be cured under section 1322(b)(5) once the mortgage debt has been
142. Id. at 800.
143. Id. at 800-01.
144. Id. at 801.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., In re Acevedo, 9 Bankr. 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (debtors not precluded from preac-
celeration cure even though state court had entered final judgment of foreclosure and sale for mortgage balance
prior to debtors' filing of chapter 13 petition); In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (even though
mortgagee has obtained a judgment of foreclosure and sale, the debtor should have an opportunity to repay his
creditors).
147. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (chapter 13 plan that did not provide
payment to mortgagee who obtained foreclosure judgment could not be confirmed); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), see supra text accompanying notes 58-68.
148. See, e.g., In re Beckman, 9 Bankr. 193 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981); In re Coleman, 2 Bankr. 348 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1980).
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reduced to a judgment. 149 The logical result of holding that a debtor cannot
cure a preacceleration default under either section 1322(b)(2) or section
1322(b)(5) once the mortgagee's claim has been reduced to ajudgment is that a
mortgagor cannot plan within chapter 13 to pay the judgment in installments.
Most debtors in need of relief will be unable to pay their entire mortgage
principal over the life of a three-year plan; even fewer debtors will be able to
pay their home mortgage debt immediately in full.
By construing section 1322(b)(2) to permit modification once the mort-
gagee's claim has been reduced to a judgment, Judge Schwartzberg would
allow the mortgagor to attempt at least to pay the principal amount of the
mortgage in installments over the life of the plan. Although most mortgagors
would not be able to do this, fewer mortgagors would be effectively precluded
from seeking chapter 13 rehabilitation under the Garner interpretation of
section 1322(b)(2) than would be precluded if they could not modify their
"immediately due and payable" mortgage judgment within a chapter 13 plan.
For this reason the Garner interpretation-permitting modification of a judg-
ment but requiring payment of the full amount of the judgment over the life of
the plan-makes more sense than an interpretation that would not permit any
modification under section 1322(b)(2) and would not allow the debtor to at-
tempt cure. In light of the congressional preference for rehabilitation rather
than liquidation, however, this interpretation makes less sense than one that
forbids modification of the accelerated debt or judgment under section
1322(b)(2) but allows modification under section 1322(b)(5) to the extent re-
quired to permit cure of preacceleration mortgage default and reinstatement
of the mortgage.
None of the bankruptcy judges' interpretations of section 1322(b) as ap-
plied to cure of preacceleration default have been entirely satisfactory. The
approach of the LaPaglia and Williams courts, in denying cure of preaccelera-
tion default, fails to satisfy important policy concerns. 5 0 On the other hand,
courts interpreting section 1322(b) to permit cure of preacceleration home
mortgage default have had trouble explaining this result in light of the stat-
ute's language. '
5
It is no reflection on the diligence or ability of the judges charged with
interpreting the effect of section 1322 on defaulted home mortgages that they
have been unable to reach a result that makes sense of the relevant provisions
of section 1322(b). Sections 1322(b)(2), 1322(b)(3), and 1322(b)(5) are am-
biguous. The legislative history of section 1322(b) does not clearly disclose
congressional intent concerning the treatment of home mortgages under the
149. Compare In re Taddeo, 9 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), with In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
150. See supra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
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chapter 13 cure provisions. It does, however, indicate that the process of
political compromise rendered section 1322(b)(5) ambiguous.
D. Conclusion
The cure provisions of chapter 13 should be interpreted to permit cure of
a defaulted home mortgage and reinstatement of payments regardless of
whether the mortgagee exercises a right of acceleration before the debtor
seeks chapter 13 relief. Strong policy reasons exist for permitting cure of
accelerated home mortgage debt when cure would have been permitted if the
mortgage had not been accelerated before filing. Permitting cure encourages
repayment of unsecured creditors by giving the debtor an important incentive
to file under chapter 13: the opportunity to try to save his home. The cost to
the mortgagee is no different from the cost Congress clearly has required the
mortgagee to pay under section 1322(b)(5) by allowing a chapter 13 plan to
modify the mortgagee's claim to the extent required to permit cure. Finally,
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to distin-
guish between accelerated and nonaccelerated debt for the purposes of per-
mitting cure of home mortgage default. For these reasons bankruptcy courts
should permit cure of preacceleration home mortgage default unless they are
prepared to give persuasive policy reasons for not doing so.
Because of the lack of consensus among bankruptcy courts, Congress
should amend the relevant provisions of section 1322(b) to clarify the permis-
sible cure issue. Inconsistent application of the Bankruptcy Code threatens to
undermine confidence in judicial and legislative processes. For example, in
the Eastern District of New York one individual whose home mortgage is
accelerated prior to his filing in chapter 13 may receive a favorable decision
while his neighbor in identical financial straits receives an unfavorable judg-
ment simply because a different judge hears his case. Unless Congress
amends the cure provisions of chapter 13, bankruptcy courts will be forced to
continue their struggle, hampered by the ambiguous language of the statute,
to reach correct results.
III. SECTION 362(d)(2) AND CHAPTER 13
For some chapter 13 debtors a liberal interpretation of the cure provi-
sions of section 1322(b)(2) will not be helpful. The debtor who lacks equity in
his home may find that chapter 13 will not help to save his family homestead
because he is unable to prevent the court from lifting the automatic stay
imposed by section 362.152 The court's interpretation of section 362(d)(2) is
crucial to the debtor without equity in his home.
A. The Controversy
Pursuant to the provisions of section 362, a petition filed under chapter 13
152. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) (Supp. I1 1979).
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operates as an automatic stay of most proceedings against the debtor's
estate.153 A party in interest'54 may obtain relief from the automatic stay
either
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 55
Section 362(g) 156 allocates the burden of proof in a hearing under section
362(d). The party requesting relief from the stay "has the burden of proof on
the issue of the debtor's equity in property." 157 The party opposing relief has
the burden of proof on all other issues. 
58
The term "reorganization" does not appear in chapter 13. For this reason
some courts have concluded that use of that term in the effective reorganiza-
tion prong of section 362(d)(2) makes section 362(d)(2) inapplicable in whole
or in part to chapter 13, 159 despite section 103 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
clearly makes chapter 3 applicable to chapter 13 cases.160
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 362(d)(2)(B) does not reveal whether
Congress intended section 362(d)(2)(B) to apply to chapter 13 cases. If passed,
the Bankruptcy Amendments Act pending in the House 161 will amend section
362(d)(2)(B) by inserting immediately after the word "reorganization" the
phrase "in a case under Chapter 11 of this title or to an effective plan in a case
under Chapter 13 of this title, as the case may be."' 62
C. The Cases
1. Section 362(d)(2) Does Not Apply to Chapter 13
In re Feimster,'63 decided shortly after the Bankruptcy Code took effect,
was one of the first cases to hold that section 362(d)(2) does not apply in its
entirety to chapter 13. In Feimster the creditor argued that the automatic stay
should be lifted from collateral of the creditor because (1) the debtor had no
equity in the collateral (a mobile home) and (2) the mobile home was not
153. Id. § 362.
154. A party in interest is not defined in the Code. It seems, however, that "party in interest" would
include the debtor, any creditor of the debtor, and the trustee.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. III 1979).
156. Id. § 362(g).
157. Id. § 362(g)(1).
158. Id. § 362(g)(2).
159. See infra notes 163-80 and accompanying text.
160. See I 1 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. III 1979), which states that "chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a
case under chapter 13 of this title."
161. S. 863, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 4682 (1981).
162. Id. § 25(d).
163. 3 Bankr. 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
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"necessary to an effective reorganization. "164 The debtor agreed that he had
no equity in the property. He also admitted that the mobile home was not
necessary to his rehabilitation.' 65 The court held, however, that section
362(d)(2) was not applicable to chapter 13 cases: "The absence of the use of
the term "reorganization" anywhere except in Chapter 11 leads this court to
the conclusion that its use in § 362(d)(2)(B) makes § 362(d)(2) applicable only
to Chapter 11 Reorganization cases; and not applicable to Chapter 13
cases." 166
The court argued that if Congress had intended to make section
362(d)(2)(B) applicable to chapter 13, Congress would have used either the
term "rehabilitation" 67 or "Chapter 13" in section 362(d)(2)(B). 161 The court
held that the creditor could have the automatic stay lifted under section
362(d)(1) only "'for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an
interest in property' of this secured creditor." 1
69
Perhaps the Feimster court was reluctant to find section 362(d)(2) appli-
cable to chapter 13 cases for reasons made explicit in In re Garner.'70 In
Garner the court recognized that section 103(a) applies chapters 1, 3, and 5 171
to cases under chapters 7, 11, and 13.172 The court stated, however, that "it
does not follow that every section and subsection in Chapter 3 must apply
with equal vigor in Chapter 13, notwithstanding that such application pro-
duces an unintended or illogical result." 173 The Garner court apparently was
apprehensive that a chapter 13 debtor would be unable to satisfy its burden of
proof under the effective reorganization prong of section 362(d)(2).174 If the
debtor could not meet his burden of proving necessity, the court would be
compelled to lift the automatic stay whenever the mortgagee could prove that
the debtor had no equity in his home. Indeed, this would be the result if one
assumes, as did the Garner court, that "[c]learly, these non-income produc-
164. Id. at 13.
165. Id. at 13-14.
166. Id. Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (Supp. I1 1979), is entitled "Reorganization"; its provisions are
available to any person who may be a debtor under chapter 7 (liquidation), except a stockbroker or a com-
modity broker, and a railroad. I I U.S.C. § 109(d) (Supp. 111 1979). The standards for determining what entities
may file for relief under chapter 7 are found in § 109(b). Section 109(e) contains standards for debtor eligibility
under chapter 13. An important purpose of chapter 13 is to provide individuals and small sole proprietors in need
of relief with an alternative to the cumbersome chapter II procedures. See H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 320 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963. To ensure that the persons for whom
chapter 13 relief is intended are the ones who employ its provisions, Congress has stated that only an individual
with regular income who falls within the limitations on debts set forth in § 109(e) may be a debtor under chapter
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. In 1979).
167. The term "rehabilitation" does not appear in chapter 13. The term frequently is used, however, to
distinguish between a chapter 11 reorganization and a chapter 13 proceeding. The latter is referred to as debtor
"rehabilitation."
168. 3 Bankr. I1, 14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
169. Id. at 15 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (Supp. I1 1979)).
170. 13 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
171. Chapter 1 contains general provisions and is codified as 11 U.S.C. § 101-109 (Supp. Itt 1979).
Chapter 3, 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-366 (Supp. 111 1979), governs case administration. Chapter 5 is entitled 'Creditors,
the Debtor, and the Estate" and is contained in II U.S.C. §§ 501-554 (Supp. 111 1979).
172. "There is no question that Code § 103(a) expressly makes Chapter 3 applicable in a Chapter 13 case."
13 Bankr. 799, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
173. Id. (emphasis in original).
174. Id. at 803.
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ing and non-business related assets are not necessary to 'an effective re-
organization.' "75
It is not at all clear, however, that a nonincome producing asset such as
the debtor's principal residence is unnecessary to an effective chapter 13 plan.
It is true that one's principal residence may not be necessary to a debtor
proceeding under chapter 13 in the same way that a piece of machinery is
necessary to an effective chapter 11 reorganization. This argument, however,
encourages interpreting the terms "necessary" and "effective" differently in
chapter 11 and chapter 13 proceedings, rather than finding that section
362(d)(2) does not apply to chapter 13 cases. Section 103 clearly commands
that all provisions of chapter 3 apply to cases under chapter 13.'76
The Garner court noted that the debtor might have applied for relief
under chapter 13 rather than under chapter 7 "only to save the house or the
automobile." 177 It is clear from the legislative history of chapter 13 that
Congress wished to encourage repayment of creditors under chapter 13 rather
than liquidation under chapter 7. t71 One of the major incentives for a debtor to
attempt repayment under chapter 13 is the provision that enables the debtor to
retain a mortgaged home and other property. 179 If the automatic stay must be
lifted when the mortgagee proves that the debtor has no equity, the debtor
who has no equity in his home might see little advantage to filing under
chapter 13. 180
If the Garner court is correct in assuming that debtors cannot meet their
burden of proving their homes' necessity to an effective reorganization, the
policy of encouraging debtor rehabilitation as an alternative to liquidation
would be enhanced by holding that section 362(d)(2) is not applicable to
chapter 13. If section 362(d)(2) is applicable in its entirety to chapter 13 but the
debtor cannot carry his burden of proving necessity, or if only the equity
prong is applicable to chapter 13, the debtor would lose his home once the
mortgagee proves that the debtor has no equity in his principal residence.
2. Only the Equity Prong Applies to Chapter 13
At least two cases have indicated that the court must lift an automatic
stay on real property of the debtor if the creditor establishes lack of equity,
175. Id.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. I1 1979).
177. 13 Bankr. 799, 803 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
178. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
179. The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment under chapter 13 rather than opting for
liquidation under chapter 7 is that it permits the debtor to protect his assets. See I I U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp.
IIl 1979). In a liquidation case the debtor must surrender his nonexempt assets for liquidation and sale by the
trustee. See II U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. In 1979).
180. "[I]f they [debtors] can't get the kind of relief they need in Chapter XIII, they won't be in Chapter
XIII. Retaining a man's home, I submit, is a very important form of relief, which he believes he must have, but
can't get now under Chapter XIII." Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1330-31 (1976) (testimony of
Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, Bankruptcy Judge, Maine).
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regardless of whether the property is necessary to an effective reorgan-
ization. 18' Neither of these cases, however, considered the degree to which
such a holding frustrates the policy objectives of chapter 13.
In re Sulzer 82 was the first reported case to suggest that the equity
requirement applies to chapter 13 cases but that the effective reorganization
provision does not. 183 Sulzer was a chapter 11 case in which the mortgagee
commenced an adversary proceeding for relief from an automatic stay. 184 The
debtor, a psychoanalyst who occasionally used his home for an office, 85
sought to prove that his principal residence was necessary to an effective
chapter 11 reorganization. 186 The court found that the debtor did not prove
that his home was necessary to an effective reorganization: 187 "An effective
reorganization is not dependent on the debtor remaining in possession of his
home; his practice may be maintained from any convenient office, including
his present office in New York City." 8
Perhaps anticipating that the frustrated debtor might seek to save his
home by filing a petition under chapter 13, the Sulzer court noted in dictum:
[H]ad the debtor filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Code; the alternative test
to be applied under Code § 362(d)(2) would only involve the debtor's equity in the
property.... In such a case, only the lack of equity test under Code § 362(d)(2)
will be the alternative to the test applicable under Code § 362(d)(1) for relief from
the automatic stay for cause shown, including the lack of adequate protection. 189
The court reached this result by recognizing that chapter 13 permits an
"Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income," not a "re-
organization." '90 The court hinted that even if the chapter 13 plan constituted
a business reorganization, as might occur if the debtor was a sole pro-
prietor,' 91 the debtor could not stop the court from lifting the automatic stay
by demonstrating that his home was necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion. ' While apparently ignoring the provision of section 1322(b)(5), the
court observed that section 1322(b)(2) prevents a debtor from modifying the
rights of mortgagees of his principal residence. 93
Only one reported case, In re Branch,'94 has held that the equity prong
181. In re Branch, 10 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980).
182. 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
183. Id. at 636.
184. Id. at 631.
185. Id. at 634.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 635.
189. Id. at 636.
190. Id.
191. A sole proprietor can petition for relief under chapter 13 if his debts do not exceed the limits set forth
in § 109(e). See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. III 1979).
192. 2 Bankr. 630, 636 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
193. Id.
194. 10 Bankr. 227 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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applies to chapter 13 but the effective reorganization prong does not.' 95 The
Branch court merely asserted that "[s]ince this is a Chapter 13 case, sub-
section '(B)' of the test is inapplicable." 19
The only argument raised in favor of construing section 362(d)(2) to re-
quire a court to lift the automatic stay if the creditor proves that the debtor
lacks equity, regardless of whether the property is necessary to an effective
reorganization, is that the effective reorganization prong uses the term "re-
organization." Although the Branch and Sulzer courts accepted this argu-
ment, it ignores the policy and intent of section 362(d)(2).
3. Section 362(d)(2) Applies in Full to Chapter 13
Most courts that have addressed the applicability of section 362(d)(2) to
chapter 13 have held that section 362(d)(2) is applicable in its entirety. 197 The
court in In re Rodebaugh'9g resolved this issue in a footnote, explaining that it
was
unable to accept the view adopted by a few bankruptcy courts, that Bankruptcy
Code § 362(d)(2)(B) is inapplicable in chapter 13 cases ... which ignore the clear
command of Bankruptcy Code § 103(a) that chapter 13 [sic] is to be applied in its
entirety in chapter 13 cases .... Of course, in some circumstances real estate may
be as essential to an effective "reorganization" of the financial affairs of a chapter
13 debtor, whether or not engaged in business, as in any chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion.'99
This result is consistent with the express provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code that apply chapter 3 to cases brought under chapter 13 .200 This result
also is consistent with the policy of promoting the use of chapter 13 rather
than chapter 7, provided the clause "necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion" is interpreted so that the debtor can meet his burden of proof on the
necessity issue. The Bankruptcy Amendments Act 201 would amend the effec-
tive reorganization prong of section 362(d)(2) to make clear the application of
195. Id. at 229.
196. Id. In support of this proposition the court cited In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(the Sulzer court noted in dictum that only § 362(d)(2)(A) would apply to a chapter 13 case), and In re Youngs, 7
Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (the Youngs court refused to decide whether § 362(d)(2) is wholly or only
partially inapplicable to chapter 13). Neither Sulzer nor Youngs squarely held that § 362(d)(2)(A) applies to
chapter 13 but § 362(d)(2)(B) does not. In re Branch is the only case to date that has reached this holding.
197. See, e.g., In re Miller, 13 Bankr. 110 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1981) (creditor sustained burden of proof on
issue of debtors' equity and debtors failed to prove property was necessary to effect reorganization); In re
Rodebaugh, 12 Bankr. 81 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981) (when real estate was unnecessary to adjustment of debts and
debtors had no equity, mortgage was entitled to relief from stay); see also In re Buschardt, 9 Bankr. 400 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1981); In re Ruank, 7 Bankr. 46 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Zelmer, 6 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1980).
198. 12 Bankr. 81 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
199. Id. at 82 n.1 (emphasis in original).
200. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
201. S. 863, 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 7893, 7895-96 (1981). See supra text accompanying
notes 161-62.
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the necessity provision to chapter 13.202 The Bill does not provide any guid-
ance, however, on how a chapter 13 debtor may demonstrate "necessity."
If a court finds that section 362(d)(2)(B) is applicable to chapter 13, it then
must determine how the debtor may satisfy his burden of proving that the
property is "necessary to an effective reorganization." The policy considera-
tions discussed above indicate that the debtor should not be required to
shoulder an impossible burden. It appears that a debtor's home, at least,
should be deemed "necessary to an effective Chapter 13 proceeding." But as
the court in In re Garner observed,
Although a debtor would be physically and emotionally inconvenienced by the
loss of a home or an automobile, an individual with regular income could, never-
theless, offer to apply that income towards the debts owed and achieve a confirma-
tion if the payments to be made under the plan satisfy the Code § 1325(a)(4)
standard as "not less than the amount that would be paid" on liquidation.20
3
The Garner court did not consider that the concept of an effective chap-
ter 13 proceeding may differ from the concept of an effective chapter 11 plan.
A chapter 11 reorganization is effective if it allows the business debtor to
maintain its corporate existence. An individual debtor will maintain his exis-
tence whether he files under chapter 7 or chapter 13. Therefore, if chapter 13
relief is to appeal to an individual debtor, it will be for reasons other than
those that make chapter 11 relief desirable to a business debtor.
One of the major reasons an individual debtor may seek chapter 13 relief
rather than bankruptcy under chapter 7 is to retain his principal residence. At
least one court has said that a chapter 13 debtor needs his home. 2°4 It is more
accurate to say that "the only reason the debtor [may have] applied for relief
under Chapter 13 was to save the house or automobile.,
20 5
A presumption that the debtor's residence is necessary to an effective
chapter 13 plan when the debtor proves that the residence is his principal
residence would be consistent with the language of the Bankruptcy Code and
with the policies underlying chapter 13. This interpretation would allocate a
meaningful burden of proof to the debtor and would be consistent with the
policy objective of encouraging debtors to attempt repayment under chapter 13
as an alternative to chapter 7 liquidation.
4. Conclusion
Policy considerations and the clear command of Code section 103 require
that the effective reorganization prong of section 362(d)(2) apply to chapter
202. "Section 362(d)(2) of title II is amended in subparagraph (B), by inserting 'in a case under chapter 13
of this title, as the case may be' immediately after 'reorganization.'" S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 25(d), 127
CONG. REC. 7893, 7895-96 (1981).
203. In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799, 803 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
204. "Here, the [chapter 13] debtors have a significant interest in rehabilitating their obligation with Central
Federal as they naturally need to keep their home." In re King, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1270, 1272 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1980).
205. In re Garner, 13 Bankr. 799, 803 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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13. Regardless of the standards that the courts employ in applying the effec-
tive reorganization prong to property other than the debtor's principal res-
idence, the debtor's home should be deemed the type of property that is
necessary to an effective chapter 13 plan. Under this interpretation a court
will not be required to lift the automatic stay whenever the mortgagee shows
that the debtor has no equity in his principal residence. If the creditor estab-
lishes lack of equity, but the debtor proves that the property is his principal
residence, the creditor will not be entitled to have the automatic stay lifted
under section 362(d)(2). The creditor, however, still could have the stay lifted
under section 362(d)(1) "for cause, including lack of adequate protection." 
206
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems of permissible cure and the application of the section
362(d)(2) effective reorganization provision to chapter 13 are fairly technical.
The importance of these issues, however, should not be obscured by their
mechanical appearance. Whether the most protected creditor should receive
additional protection at the expense of the debtor and other creditors is
crucial to all those involved in chapter 13 proceedings. Congress clearly in-
tended to encourage debtor rehabilitation as an alternative to liquidation.
Rehabilitation generally provides unsecured creditors with a greater dividend
than they would have received under a liquidation, while permitting the
debtor to retain much of his property. Ambiguities in chapter 13 should be
resolved in light of these broad policy considerations. In the absence of a clear
legislative mandate debtors should not be effectively precluded from making
use of chapter 13 or discouraged from attempting rehabilitation in the interest
of over-protecting the most secure of all creditors, the mortgagee of the
debtor's principal residence. Until Congress clarifies its intent about section
1322(b) and section 362(d)(2), courts should interpret these sections to in-
crease the availability to debtors of chapter 13.
Susan L. Russell-Chema
206. II U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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